Job Market Paper
Motivated or Mobilized? Competitiveness, Campaign Effort, and Turnout in U.S. Elections
Voter turnout is driven by two strategic forces: voters are more likely to participate when they perceive their ballot to be influential, and candidates allocate effort to shape the outcome of the race. These are termed the voting efficacy channel and the candidate effort channel, respectively. Existing structural models analyze these mechanisms in isolation, yet both are jointly determined with electoral competitiveness. I develop and estimate a structural model of U.S. presidential elections in which all three are determined in equilibrium. The model successfully reproduces both reduced-form estimates of the efficacy channel's direct effects on turnout and observed patterns of campaign advertising. The results indicate that the 6 percentage-point turnout gap between battleground and non-battleground states is fully accounted for by these mechanisms, with one-third due to the effects of competitiveness on voting efficacy and two-thirds to candidate effort. I also estimate the cost of mobilization, finding a marginal cost of about $250 per additional voter, though average costs are much smaller at around $150 per vote. Finally, I apply the model to evaluate the effect of several institutional reforms on both campaign strategy and voter participation: a public financing cap, policies that alter the cost of voting, and a shift to a national popular vote.
Other Research
Why People Vote: Comparing Models of Voter Turnout
(with Maxime Cugnon de Sévricourt)
This paper provides a systematic comparison of leading theoretical models of voter turnout using a common empirical framework. We structurally estimate calculus of voting, mobilization, persuasion, and group-norm models on U.S. House and state special election data. Formal model selection tests show that a calculus of voting model best fits observed turnout in federal elections, while mobilization models perform better in low-salience special elections.
Tempting FAIT: Flexible Average Inflation Targeting and the Post-COVID U.S. Inflation Surge
(with R. Duncan and E. MartÃnez GarcÃa)
In August 2020, the Federal Reserve replaced Flexible Inflation Targeting (FIT) with Flexible Average Inflation Targeting (FAIT), which allows inflation to temporarily exceed the 2% target. Using augmented and spillover-adjusted synthetic control methods, we estimate that FAIT raised headline CPI by about 1 percentage point and core CPI by 0.5 percentage points. Short- to medium-term inflation expectations increased by approximately 0.8 percentage points, while long-term expectations remained anchored. Effects on economic activity were minimal. Results are robust across alternative indices, estimators, control groups, and adjustments for supply chains, fiscal policy, and monetary aggregates. These findings are consistent with a steeper-than-expected post-pandemic Phillips curve in the New Keynesian framework.
Works in Progress
Historical Redistricting and the Incentives of Gerrymanders
(with Laurent Bouton, Garance Genicot, and Juan Felipe Riaño)This project uses historical Census data and redistricting maps from the 19th century to the present to study how sudden institutional changes reshaped the incentives of political actors engaged in district design.
Optimal Employee Allocation in Hierarchical Organizations
(with Juan Felipe Riaño)We develop a formal model of bureaucratic resource allocation, examining how central authorities assign tasks and personnel across multiple layers to balance efficiency and specialization.